By Neil
Harris
BY 1989 the new spate of
sectarian “loyalist” murders had been noticed and the press were starting to
take an interest. Concerned by criticism, the UDA/UFF tried to justify its murderous
acts by producing “evidence” in the form of Army or RUC intelligence material.
This was the case with
the murder of Loughlin Maginn and others. Copies of Army “montages” (collections
of photographs of “people of interest”) were handed to the press and on a
couple of occasions copies were pasted on Belfast walls.
For the British state
this was bad publicity and when The Guardian
newspaper published some of the montages, action had to be taken. The fact that
Garda intelligence was being passed to “loyalist” death squads was particularly
embarrassing, especially as the Irish government was putting on pressure. The
name “Finucane” wouldn’t go away and America was watching.
As a result, Sir John
Stevens, a Chief Constable, was appointed to carry out a limited inquiry into
the leaks, to put the problem to sleep. But Stevens had learned from the
destruction of Deputy Chief Constable John Stalker on a previous inquiry and
was determined to protect himself and his team.
As a result the genie
was let out of the bottle and his little investigation turned into three major inquiries.
A real battle of wits began between the team of ordinary London detectives and
the secret world of the “dirty war” in Ireland. The obstruction they faced was
extraordinary and worthy of an article in itself. Both the RUC and Army
deliberately withheld vital evidence from the inquiry.
At an initial RUC
Special Branch briefing, one of the Stevens team asked about British Army
agents, only to be told that the British Army did not run any informants in
Ireland.
The FRU seized and hid Brian
Nelson’s “intelligence dump”, essential for any investigation into the leaking
of secret documents. Its existence was not disclosed to Stevens for four
months, until the arrest and charging of Brian Nelson made it inevitable. It is
likely that the “dump” was washed clean during that time.
The Security Service seemed
embarrassed by the RUC Special Branch failing to disclose RUC links to “loyalist”
paramilitaries, stating in a remarkably candid letter:
"It is not clear
why there is no similar document relating to the RUC – perhaps Stevens only
asked about the UDR. Certainly our researches suggest that RUC links are as
extensive as the UDR's; although it is probably fair to say that RUC officers
would not have committed so many offences of murder, manslaughter, firearms
offences and so on."
Steven’s office was bugged
and broken into and the secure safes may have been opened. In the end the
offices were burnt out on 10th January 1990, just before Nelson was due
to be arrested. In his Overview and
Recommendations report published in April 2003 Sir John Stevens stated::
"This incident, in my opinion, has never been adequately investigated and
I believe it was a deliberate act of arson."
In short there was an
active cover up by the Army and RUC. The case of Martin Ingram is helpful here:
the author Ingram is in fact Ian Hurst, an Army Officer and member of the FRU
West Detachment, the section running agents in Nationalist organisations.
Hurst’s evidence at various inquiries has been pretty inconvenient for the
State; he is a whistleblower now and he has a record of not being believed.
That doesn’t make his evidence untrue.
Before the Stevens inquiries,
he gave evidence of conversations with Nelson’s handler and other officers of
the FRU East Detachment about the murder of Finucane:
"Hurst: There was
… intelligence pre the actual attack … I was told by A/04 that that information
had been passed to the RUC …”
Detective Superintendent
S/02: “… do you know as a fact or did you take it that that information was
supplied to the FRU by Nelson.”
Hurst: “Oh that,
without a shadow of a doubt that is the only, that was the only conduit.”
S/02: “But are you
saying that within the FRU there was knowledge that Finucane was a target?”
Hurst: “Oh yeah that
was undoubted that."
In his written
statement, Hurst set it out;
"My clear understanding
[from conversations with A/04] was that there was pre-emptive intelligence in
regards to Finucane on two occasions and that there is little doubt that Nelson
had told FRU that Finucane was being targeted. I believe that the RUC were
informed on the first occasion. I don't know why the first targeting did not
actually take place as I recollect it was the most serious of the threats but
the second was allowed to proceed."
He also confirmed that FRU
had passed intelligence to Nelson about Finucane before the murder; "I am
80/90 per cent certain that [A/04] said there was a photograph of Finucane
passed to Nelson by FRU."
Hurst gave evidence
that Nelson’s handler (A/13) had the full support of her Commanding Officer (A/05):
"[A/13] said quite clearly that [A/05] … held the view that he was content
with the case and it was 'bomb proof' and being overseen by political
masters."
Most importantly of
all, Hurst gave evidence that the “Contact Forms” (CF’s) that the Finucane
Review trusted so completely were edited and altered: “In January 1990 I
remember [A/04] explaining to me that in relation to Nelson he would be
spending several months sorting the CFs out as there were a few problems and
there needed to be a few subtle changes made to the CFs."
In his statement Hurst
said that A/04 "would be required to travel from Fermanagh to Lisburn for
this reason".
Ingram/Hurst has not
just had problems because they don’t believe him; he also has problems because
he might be believed. When he started writing books and articles after he left
the Army, he was arrested by Special Branch and made subject to a Court
injunction.
Then last year he made
a statement as a core participant in the Leveson Inquiry into Press Standards.
In 2004 he had moved to France, where so many in the secret and security world
seem to go to retire. The much delayed police inquiries into Murdoch’s News
International had revealed how in 2006, the News
of the World hired a private detective (X), who had been a fellow member of
the FRU serving with Ingram for three years. X inserted a “Trojan” into Hurst’s
computer, giving access to his files and E-mails, ostensibly on behalf of the
newspaper but with the clear intention of discrediting him and his evidence.
The decision whether or
not to prosecute Nelson for his crimes, following the Stevens recommendations,
is where the cover up gets really interesting. The Ministry of Defence fought
very hard to stop a prosecution; their written advice to their minister Tom King,
26/9/90 stated that a prosecution would;
"… challenge the
integrity of the system … by revealing that … [Nelson] … was not merely a paid
informer but a long-term agent who was allowed to continue as an active member
of a terrorist organisation which committed many murders while he was acting as
its intelligence officer. It would feed the speculations of those who believe
that the security forces are involved in a 'dirty tricks campaign' and are in
collusion with loyalist paramilitary groups."
As a result King
recommended that “overall, he regarded it as important that [Nelson] should not
go near the courts". King based his view on the briefing from the MOD
Civil Servants, which they had got from FRU. Nothing was to change King’s view,
even when the evidence of Nelson’s role turned out to be false.
Representations against
prosecution were made by the Minister for Northern Ireland on behalf of the
RUC, the Defence Minister on behalf of the Army and both the Home secretary and
the Director General of the Security Service on behalf of MI5.
The Civil Service then
weighed in on behalf of the Security Forces when the Cabinet Secretary, Sir
Robin Butler, minuted the Prime Minister, John Major on 15th March
1991 outlining the "damage" that could be caused by proceeding with
the proposed murder charges against Nelson. Charles Powell, the Prime
Minister's Private Secretary, provided a similar briefing to the Prime Minister
before a meeting of relevant cabinet ministers, repeating the Army’s lies about
Nelson.
Even when those lies
were exposed, the arguments continued, more frantically than ever. In the end,
Nelson was to be prosecuted, although half-heartedly. A note from the Prime
Ministers principal secretary gives away Civil Service hopes of how the case
might work out:
"One possibility
is that when it becomes apparent that the prosecution case is relying on
Nelson's debriefing to his handlers and treating it like a confession, the
defence will object on grounds that this is not a proper statement taken under
Police and Criminal Evidence Act. If the objection is sustained the case could
collapse at the start - a very good outcome. [Attorney General] and DPP (NI)
consciences are salved and case comes to an end before too much damage is
done."
In the end a number of
charges were to be dropped, including any relating to the murder of Finucane.
In court further charges were to be withdrawn following a deal between the
prosecuting and defending barristers.
When Nelson came to be
sentenced, “Colonel J”, the Commanding Officer of FRU gave evidence on oath on
his behalf, supposedly outlining the lives saved by Nelson’s work. In his inquiry
into the affair, Justice Cory stated that:
"The evidence
given by the CO FRU, (Soldier ‘J’), at Nelson's trial could only be described
as misleading. The statement that Nelson's actions were responsible for saving
close to 217 lives was based on a highly dubious numerical analysis that cannot
be supported on any basis."
The result of this was an
unduly lenient sentence of 10 years for an involvement in four murders, and as
we now know, many other unproved serious crimes. This should not come as any
surprise, as the Ministry of Defence’s submission to the Secretary of State for
Defence dated 26th September
1990 revealed that:
"[Nelson] is now
in a position where he has to rely on us to protect his life (either in or out
of prison) and the lives of his [family]: such protection would be conditional
on his remaining silent about our covert operations."
That October, Nelson
was granted an interim resettlement package of £1,650 per month in payments to
his wife. In an internal note (6/11/90), the Army was looking to persuade him
to accept an MOD recommended solicitor to open a “channel of communication”
with him and to reassure him: “The Army is paying close attention to his case
and looking after his wife; and will resettle him when he is released, subject
to his remaining silent on what he knows."
What we have seen is
clear collusion between Army Intelligence (FRU), the Royal Ulster Constabulary,
the Ulster Defence Regiment and “loyalist” death squads. This was with the
intention of directing them towards people the Army and Police wanted executed,
using Brian Nelson as a conduit to pass over intelligence that would identify
the favoured targets.
Above that level, the security
service and senior civil servants were only too happy to endorse that tactic
and participate in the cover up when it all started to unravel.
What about the
politicians, supposedly in charge of the State, but in reality reliant on
briefings from civil servants and the security forces? The review quotes R/16,
a former senior Royal Ulster Constabulary Special Branch (RUC SB) officer, who
described briefings to Ministers as follows:
"These briefing
papers would not deal with the identity of particular agents because such
operational details were not considered to be the domain of the political
leadership; indeed, [R/16] considered that if they were wise the political
leadership would steer clear of such details."
In short, the
politicians chose whether they would be part of the cover up or remain ignorant
and not ask embarrassing questions. Either way this left the State and the soldiers
to get on with it.
What was the result of
the cover up? In 1999, they did it again. Rosemary Nelson, a feisty and
determined solicitor happy to represent unpopular clients was blown up by a car
bomb placed by the “Red Hand Commando”, following the same pattern of RUC
threats made through her clients.
What was the result of
the inquiries into the death of Rosemary Nelson? They did it all over again. “Colonel
J”, Officer Commanding FRU, (Gordon Kerr) was promoted to Brigadier and was
eventually appointed Military Attaché at the British embassy in Beijing to get
him out of the way.
Following the invasion
of Iraq, he was placed in charge of the same kind of Army intelligence
operations there that he had run in Ireland during the 1980’s. Now that he is
retired, there will be other Frank Kitson’s and Gordon Kerr’s, eager to do it
all over again unless we stop them.
