By Neil
Harris
THE CHANGING tactics of the Communist
International (1919 to 1943) have become so associated with Lenin, Trotsky or
Stalin and their respective followers, that it has become almost impossible to
have a useful discussion about tactics at all. No one now can see beyond the
positions the Bolshevik party’s factions held, even though Lenin died 89 years
ago, Trotsky 73 years and Stalin 60 years ago.
Those who cling
tightly to one Comintern thesis, like a lifebelt, are actually drowning in
their own dogmatism – times change. Yet those tactics were tested out during
the most dangerous of times and it’s a shameful waste to ignore the lives,
sacrifices and experiences of those communists who came before us. An inability
to freely debate tactics effectively accepts the reformist assumptions that
dominate the left in Britain today and it’s also unscientific. For a moment
let’s wipe away the dust of the past and take a fresh look at tactics through
the eyes of a child of the 21st century.
It must be emphasised that this article deals
only with the western European experience. The question of working class alliances
with the peasantry in revolutionary struggles, or with other social groups as
part of struggles for national liberation, are a matter for comrades in
countries with those experiences to analyse for themselves.
Of course,
tactics are not the same thing as strategy - the Communist International only
ever had one strategy – revolution. Following the 1917 Russian revolution the
shockwaves flew around the world like a tsunami, That was why the International
was created: to build revolutionary communist parties in every country of the
world. In Europe the aim was to ride the revolutionary wave that followed the
First World War. In the developing world it was to help the anti-colonial and
anti-imperialist movements that were springing up wherever there was an empire
or a feudal ruler.
So much for
strategy, tactics are the everyday ways communists work for revolution. The
really difficult question has always been what tactic to use while waiting for
that once in a lifetime revolutionary situation to arrive. Those opportunities
pass quickly.
The point of
having an international was to pool worldwide communist experience, analyse the
balance of power in the class struggle and hammer out a line of march. Its
strength was to be in its unity, the strong parties would bring on the weak.
The method was to be scientific – to propose a course of action and then test
it. To work properly that needed discipline (a worldwide form of democratic
centralism) because if the tactic succeeded it would be developed further, if
it failed – it would be dropped and a new thesis adopted.
The
International had an Executive Committee that made day-to-day decisions and
periodic congresses that dealt with major policy. There were commissions that
considered questions concerning individual parties or regions and these made
recommendations to the executive. Comintern agents, chosen from quite different
regions or countries, would be sent to observe and advise national parties on Comintern
policy and, if necessary, to ensure those decisions were carried out locally.
Contrary to what the enemies of communism
always claimed, Comintern policy was never the work of one man or one country
but many. From 1919 to 1922 it was easy; revolutions were breaking out all over
Europe. The urgent task was to split the working class movement, to win class
conscious workers away from reformism and into the new, revolutionary communist
parties. All that mattered to Lenin was how to build those new parties quickly
enough, while keeping out the opportunism and reformism that had destroyed
social democracy as a revolutionary force for socialism.
In Britain that
involved merging different, rival groups of activists whose revolutionary
heritage was sometimes questionable, and then welding them together into one party,
the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB). Lenin understood that the British
Labour Party’s unique federal constitution allowed for affiliation; individuals
could do so through their trade unions and parties as autonomous “socialist
societies”, allowing both to keep their revolutionary politics intact.
Affiliation allowed communists to be both separate to and part of the Labour
Party at the same time and while it was possible, the CPGB was allowed to
follow that policy by the International. However Lenin was equally clear that
Labour leaders would always follow the bourgeoisie and as a result Labour would
always be a reformist party.
That proved to
be the case; for a while communists were able to stand for Parliament as “Labour-communist
candidates” and in a number of constituencies won seats. As soon as the Labour
leadership realised what was happening; communists were excluded and banned.
The CPGB was then returned to the general line of the Comintern.
That line was to
split revolutionaries away from social democracy, a policy which was strongly
influenced by experiences in Germany where social democratic regional governments
and social democrat police chiefs had been enthusiastic in ordering the murder
of communists and left social democrats fighting for the German “soviets”.
Unfortunately
the revolutionary tide in Europe ebbed quickly and by 1922 the 3rd and
4th congresses of the
Comintern adopted a new tactic to meet that situation: “The united front tactic
is simply an initiative whereby the Communists propose to join with all workers
belonging to other parties and groups and all unaligned workers in a common struggle
to defend the immediate, basic interests of the working class against the
bourgeoisie.”
Imperialism had
quickly changed its tactics, learning from the experience gained during
revolutions in Russia, Germany and Hungary. The united front policy recognised
both this and the economic recovery that capitalism had made after the war. Now
that the revolutionary tide was gone, the struggle was going to take time. In
particular, the majority of workers were still supporting social democratic
rather than revolutionary movements.
The tactic was
intended to unite all rank and file workers in class struggles that would lead
them towards revolutionary activity, irrespective of whether they were in
communist or social democratic parties. At the same time this would expose the
opportunism and reformism of their social democratic leaders by simply
sidestepping them. This was “the united front from below”. It also had the
added advantage of uniting all the main players in the Soviet Union; Lenin,
Stalin and Trotsky, behind the same policy.
By 1928 the Comintern
had moved to the left again and a new thesis: the “third period” or “class
against class” policy was adopted at the 6th congress. It was a
dramatic shift and to this day is attacked by the right as “ultra-leftist” and
by the Trotskyites as “Stalinist”. It was neither.
The actual title
comes from the analysis that the 1920s were divided into three parts; the
"First Period" characterised by the economic collapse and workers
revolutions that followed the end of the First World War. The "Second Period" was the post
war period of capitalist recovery and counter revolution. In 1928 the Comintern
predicted there would be a “‘third period” of major economic collapse and
revolutionary situations lasting through the 1930s.
As a result it
aimed to shift the international to the offensive again, further bolshevising
the national parties, emphasising illegal activity and confronting reformism
head on. In addition to the working class, the unemployed and servicemen
(serving or demobilised) were to be organised on revolutionary lines and the
trades union movement was to be split to create revolutionary, militant unions
free from the Socialist International’s reformism. The new line assumed that
the revolutionary tide would return and that when it did, the communists would
be ready to lead the working class.
The third period
made little differentiation between different forms of bourgeois state –
treating dictatorial autocracy, bourgeois democracy and fascism as simply
different shades of the same dictatorship.
In particular it
was a policy that highlighted the traitorous nature of social democracy – which
for years had supported Marxist revolution and opposed imperialist wars in
grandiose resolutions. Yet on the outbreak of the First World War the parties
of the Second International had voted with their own national imperialisms for
war on their fellow workers.
Faced with the rising tide of working
class militancy after that war, the social democratic leadership in every country
sided with reaction and sometimes even supported the prototype forms of
fascism, to put down workers revolutions. Now that new revolutions were
predicted, social democracy would not be given a chance to do the same again.
Nowadays it is
easy to forget how bitter the memories of that social democratic treachery were:
in Berlin, Budapest or Vienna. Here in Britain, the same treachery was behind
the defeat in the General Strike. In a quote which sums up the policy, it was
said: “the social democrats are merely the left wing of the bourgeoisie”.
None of these
views or the third period policy itself would have offended Lenin, Stalin or
Trotsky in 1917 but by 1928 Lenin was dead and ideological trenches had been
dug, the positions were set.
The Comintern
had other concerns too; in 1927 the Chinese Goumintang treacherously turned on
their communist party allies in the United Front, murdering as many communists
as they could find. The year before, despite Soviet assistance, the General
Strike in Britain was defeated and the Comintern rightly saw this as a
catastrophic defeat for the international movement as well as for the British
working class.
The policy was
developed at a time of relative prosperity but it correctly anticipated the
coming economic collapse and the growing risk of war. A year later in 1929 the
capitalist world was to plunge into the greatest crisis it had ever known – the
Wall Street crash and then the Great Depression. From 1931 onwards, there was a
stampede amongst the imperialist powers to gain new colonies that could only
ever lead to an inter-imperialist war – the first outbreak of which was the
attack on China that year and the last was the attack on the Soviet Union in
1941.
The young Soviet
Union itself was under attack from every side – externally it faced a renewed
threat of war and an arms race it could not afford while internally there was
sabotage and disruption. The year 1927 was particularly bad, a year of war
scares, assassinations, attacks on Soviet embassies and revolutionary defeats. It was not difficult for communists to see
these as signals of the coming final conflict between capital and labour, the
beginning of the “death throws” of capitalism. It heralded dangerous times and
most communists looking at social democracy could only see treachery.
But while
economic collapse came quickly, reaction prevented the predicted workers’
risings. In Italy fascism was in power, throughout the rest of Europe either
fascism or more traditional forms of dictatorship were coming. Instead of
revolution, it was to be a further period of brutal counter revolution.
For its
opponents, the “third period” policy was projected as a disaster; it was said
to have divided the working class, isolated communists from that class and
hindered united working class opposition to fascism. This is unfair, even if
there is some element of truth to it; social democracy was only too desperate
to isolate communists and was happy to do deals with fascism in order to do so.
In fact
communist parties, although small, were leading the struggles against
unemployment, poverty and fascism. The party was to be found wherever the fight
was at its toughest, and the inspiration was the Soviet Union and the International.
The prestige that communists won during this period of intense class struggle
was so great that it lasted amongst the wider working class for decades, like
the glow left behind long after a super-nova dies down. The word “communist”
brought courage to workers and fear to their enemies long after the policy and
the parties had changed; that deep class memory was still being exploited by
the revisionist euro communists up until the 1980s.
Either way,
experience of reality brought about a debate in the Comintern which became more
urgent after the Nazis took power in Germany in 1933. Opposition to the third
period policy grew within the Comintern until in 1935 it was replaced with the “Popular
Front” as championed by the Bulgarian anti-fascist Georgi Dimitrov. This was to
be an alliance between communists and other parties (in other words with other
classes) to unite in the fight against fascism.
The “popular
front” grew out lessons learnt from Germany and the new analysis that there was
something exceptional about the fascist state as opposed to the ordinary bourgeois
dictatorship. As a result it was necessary to unite with any democratic force
that was prepared to ally itself with the communists in the fight against
fascism. This was to create alliances to preserve basic individual liberties –
something as precious to the working class as it was to bourgeois individuals
themselves.
It would set the
wider political agenda for the rest of the 1930s and would be Comintern policy
until the organisation was dissolved in 1943. Arguably it was also the basis of
the international alliance against the Axis powers agreed in 1941 as well as
the origin of the “people’s democracies” of Eastern Europe after the war –
where communist and social democratic parties merged to form socialist parties.
After all, the communists and social democrats who had fought each other in the
1920s and 1930s found themselves together in the concentration camps and
prisons of fascism.
As a policy it
had some successes; the popular front government in France stopped French
fascism from winning power and won the working class real gains like the eight-hour
day and paid holidays. In Spain the Popular Front built a viable opposition to
the military coup d’état, even though the Spanish Civil War was to end in
defeat.
Emergencies
happen and occasionally bizarre alliances are necessary. Sometimes that might
even require an alliance with those who compromise with the class enemy and
oppose revolution. At various times in the revolutionary struggle, Lenin made
alliances with right social democrats and anarchists. Unfortunately, what
should have been a short term emergency tactic was to be seized on by those in
communist parties who saw the parliamentary road as the preferred strategy
rather than merely a tactic. The result was the postponement of revolution
until some distant point in the future – a point that was never going to happen
if the “parliamentarians” had anything to do with it.
In any case the
successes of the popular front were to be only temporary. With the dissolution
of the Comintern it became possible for national parties to adopt national
roads to socialism – and in Europe that usually meant that they chose reformism
over revolution. Certainly that was the case in Britain, where British
communists had been unhappy and unwilling in the 1930s when the International
forced them to prepare for illegality.
Often, as in the
case of the [British Road to Socialism],
there were discussions about tactics going up to the very highest levels but
because Soviet policy after 1943 was to avoid any interference in the internal
affairs of fraternal parties, these discussions were limited to giving advice
only.
The decision to
dissolve the Comintern had been on the basis that national parties were mature
enough to determine their own political positions. Not only was that not the
case, it turned out to be a terrible mistake. The example of the Soviet party
and the discipline of the international movement had held back revisionism.
Once the international had gone the tactics became opportunistic. In Britain this process actually began in
1941 when the party embraced the war effort with an enthusiasm which went far
beyond the needs of the anti-fascist struggle; if it had not been for Palme
Dutt and the international that process would have already begun in 1939. Soon
those opportunist tactics developed into strategy and the only strategy offered
was the parliamentary road.
In the event,
the “socialist” parties of the second international proved to be willing allies
of American and British imperialism when the war was over. Wherever communists
had entered coalition governments, as in France and Italy, the advantage was to
be short-lived, ending with expulsion and permanent opposition. Throughout the
Cold War, European social democratic parties chose to preserve capitalism and
support the Nato alliance against the Soviet Union. Once again they supported
the use of state power against both communists and left social democrats as
soon as they could get away with it.
There was to be
one last doomed example; the French “socialist unity” government of the 1980s,
otherwise the popular front, was over. There, for one last time communists
entered a bourgeois government, this time with Mitterrand’s “socialists”. As
usual the process started with the simple surrender of any remaining
revolutionary positions but the outcome was inevitable: it could only end in
suicide.
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